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ABSTRACT
The optimal level of Social Security benefits depends on balancing
the protection that these benefits offer to those who have not provided
adequately for their own old age against the welfare costs of distorting
economic behavior. The primary such cost is the distortion in private
saving. The present paper derives the level of Social Security benefits
that is optimal in three basic cases.
In the first section of the paper, the optimal level of benefits is
derived for an economy in which all individuals do not anticipate retire-
ment at all and therefore do not save. The second and third sections then
derive the optimal benefits for economies with two different definitions
of attitudes toward retirement and saving.
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The provision of social security retirement benefits is a major
government activity in every industrial nation. IntheUnited States, these
publicpensions now account for more than 20 percent of the federal budget. The
principle rationale for such mandatory programs is that some individuals lack
the foresight to save for their retirement years. Since the provision of social
security benefits imposes real costs on a nation, the optimal level of benefits
requires balancing the protection of the nropic against the costs of distorted
real resource allocation.
The primary cost of providing social security benefits is the welfare
loss that results from reductions in private saving.1 In addition, the paent
of benefits distorts retirement behavior and the imposition of the tax used to
finance the program distorts the labor supply during the preretirement period.2
If tastes differ and borrowing is restricted, some individuals may be forced to
consume more in their retirement years than they would with perfect foresight
have chosen to do. Although all three types of welfare cost should be considered
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'The tax used to finance the pension affects the reward forpreretirement work
effort ——unlessthe benefits of each individual provide an actuarily fair
return based on the net—of—tax rate of return available to that individual.
For a discussion of the nature of this welfare cost, see Feldstein (l982b).
There has been substantial research on the effect of social security on private
saving. Although there is no agreement on the magnitude of this effort, most
studies find that social security reduces private saving. See e.g., Blinder,
Gordon and Wise (1981), Diamond and Haussman (1982), Feldstein (19T6, 1982a) and
Kotlikoff (1979).
D2in selecting the optimal benefit level, the present analysis focuses exclusively
on the savings distortion.
In principle, the adverse effect of social security benefits on pri.-
vate saving can be offset if the government accumulates an adequately large
social security trust fund (Feldstein, 1977). Mare generally, as Samuelson
(1975) has noted, a social security trust fund could acquire enough capital to
bring the econon to golden rule efficiency. In general, this would require
that the social security obligations are more than fully funded and may require
the trust fund to own the nation's entire capital stock. As a practical matter,
however, the social security programs in the United States and in many other
countries operates on a pay—as—you—go basis without a capital fund.I shall in
this paper derive the optimal benefit level in an unfunded program.
To focus on the welfare cost imposed by the saving distortion, I will
assume that labor is supplied inelastically and that the retirement date is exo-
genous. This also excludes the problem of uncertain health status that Diamond
and Mirrles (1978, 1981) have examined. In the economy that I study, all indivi-
duals also have equal earnings and identical tastes although they differ in
their ability to plan during their working years for their future retirement
period. There is no uncertainty about future rates of return, rates of popula-
tiongrowth, productivity and demographics.
The paperbegins by deriving the optimal level of benefits in an
economy in which individuals do not anticipate their retirement at all and there-
fore do no saving.This establishes the general framework of analysis and pro-
vides a standard of reference for evaluating the effect of more realistic saving
behavior on the optimal level of benefits. The second and third sections then—3—
derive these optimal benefit levels for two different definitions of incomplete
myopia. There is a brief concluding section that discusses possible extensions
of this analysis.
1.Qptimal Social Security with Complete Myopia
The framework of analysis here follows Samuelson (1958) and uses a
life cycle model withoverlapping generations. Individuals workin thefirst
period of their lives and retire in the second. The population grows at rate n
per period. But unlike Samuelsonts analysis, I assume that physical capital is
a productive resource.'lb avoid the problem of an endogenous and varying rate
of return, I assume that the marginal product of capital remains constant at p.
If Lt is the labor force at time t and At is the number of aged




Fach worker in period t earns a age of wt. The government imposes a tax at
rateGfandtherefore collects taxes of
(1.3) =
Eachagedretiree receives benefits of bt, implying that total benefits are
Bt=btAt.
The pay—as—you—go character of the program implies that benefits and taxes are
eqia1 (Bt =Tt)and therefore that(1.5) btAt =OtwtLt.
From equation 1.2 it therefore follows that
(i.6) =Ow.(i+
Equation1.6 shows the relation between the social securitytaxrate and the
level of benefits relative to concurrent earnings.
I will write the utility function of the representative individual in
separable form as uIJ +v[1where the argument of the u function is first
period consumption and the argument of the v function is consumption during
retirement. Since the individual is nropic and does no saving, first period con-
sumption is the net—of—tax wage, (1—O)w, and retirement consumption is the
social security benefit, bt. An additive social welfare function implies that
social welfare at time t is
(1.7) =LuE(1_O)wI +AtvEbt
={(i+n)uI(1_6t)wtl +v[btl} Lt_i.
Using 1.6 to replace bt implies:
(i.8) Wt =((1+n)u[(1_Ot)vtl +vIOw(1+nfl} LLt_l•
The first order condition for a maximumofWt is dWt/det =0or




Itis thus optimal1 to divide the total income of the working generations between
the young and the old until their n.rginal utilities of consumption are
equalized. This egalitarian optimum reflects the assumption that taxes do not
distort any type of behavior and is reminiscent of the Edgeworth (1897) and
Lerner (1944) conclusions about optimal income taxation and income redistribution.
Obtaining an explicit value for the optimal level of benefits requires
making an assumption about the nature of the utility functions of workers and
retirees. If we assume that u and v have the same functional form, the optimum
condition of equation 1.10 implies that the arguments of u and v are equal and
therefore that the optimal tax rate, Ot, satisfies
(1.11) (l_e*) w =twt(1+n)
or
(1.12) 0t2+n
Substituting &*.intoequation 6showsthat the ratio of optimal benefits, b*t,
to concurrent wages is
(1.13) *= = ______
Notefirst that the optimal tax rate and the optimal benefit ratio are
constants that are independent of time. If there is no population growth (n0),
0* =* = -/2.In this case, workers give up half of their wages in tax and
retirees receive benefits that are equal to half of the annual wage level. When
the population is growing (n >0),there are more workers than retirees. If
11t is clear from 1.9 and 1.8 that the second order conditionis always
satisfied.——
eachworker gives up in taxes less than half of his wages, the retirees can
still receive benefits that equal more than half of the annual wage level. The
specific fraction is chosen to make the level of benefits equal to the after—tax
wage. The faster the rate of population growth, the lower is the optimal tax
rate and the higher is the corresponding ratio of benefits to wages.
To provide a numerical illustration of these optimal values, it is
important to recognize that n refers to the growth rate per period and not per
year. Since Lt/L÷_i =1+n,the value of n is the growth rate per generation.
If the annual population growth rate is 1.14 percent1 and a generation is 30
years, 1 +n=(1.014)30=1.52.Equation 1.13 then implies that =0.60and
=0.40.A decline in the population growth rate to 0.7 percent a year
30
implies that 1 +n=(1.007)=1.23and therefore that optimal benefits are
lower (* =0.55)while the optimal tax rate is higher (e* =0.145).
2. Optimal Social Security Benefits with Partial Myopia
In reality, of course, not everyone is completely myopic. The
interesting problem is therefore to characterize the appropriate partial nropia
and to derive the corresponding optimal level of social security benefits. That
optimization involves balancing the advantage of income support for the nropic
against the loss caused by reduced saving.
Economic irropia has two aspects. The most important is that some or
all individual's have, in Pigou's (1920) words, a "faulty telescopic faculty't
that causes them to give too little weight to the utility of future consumption.
Such faulty vision may also cause them to ignore or underestimate the size of
their future social security benefits, thereby reducing the extent to which
1This was the average annual growth rate for the three decades beginning in 1950.-7-
those promised benefits change personal saving.
One way to model incomplete riropia is to divide the population into
two types, the first of which optimizes according to life cycle principles with
perfect foresight while the second is completely myopic and does no saving. The
optimal level of social security benefits depends on the relative numbers of
life—cyclers and myopes in the population. I will develop this approach in the
next section.
The second ay to analyze the problem is to assume that all indivi-
duals are alike and are neither perfectly foresighted life—cyclers nor comple-
tely myopic.1 though the individual's "true" utility function is given by
u(c1) + v(c2) where c1 and c2 are consumption during the first and second
periods of his life, he makes his saving decision during the first period of his
life by maximizing u(c1) + A v(c2) where A '1represents the degree of
discounting of future consumption. If A =1,the individual is a proper life—
cycler with no myopia. If A =0,the individual is completely myopic and has no
reason to save.
Each individual earns a wage of wt during his working years, pays
taxes of and chooses to save St. His first period consumption is therefore
Ct =(1—O)w—s.His saving earns a rate of return p and therefore provides
him with st(1-+-p) in his retirement period. Ib simplify the analysis, I shall
ignore capital income taxes in this section. The individual's consumption
during retirement is thus = (1+p) + bt+i where bt+i is the
individual's social security benefit. Myopic individuals may not only give too
little weight to v(c2) but may also underestimate their future social security
11t would of course bepossible to analyze a more general case in which there
is a distribution of degrees of nopia but this would probably provide no addi-
tional analytic insights.benefits by anticipating future consumption of only Bt(l+p) + a with a < 1.
To summarize, each individual chooses St to maximize u[(l_O)wt—st]
+ Av [st(1+P) + t+i}. Society chooses 0 to maximize the sum over all
periods of the true utilities uI(l—0) wt_stl + v [s(l+P) + bt+i] wherethe St
must be chosen by the individuals themselves.
The individual's first order condition for maximizing lifetime utility
with 0 and taken as parameters is
(2.1) = X(l+p).
Thelower the value of A, the lower is the chosen u' relative to v' and there-
fore the higher is the chosen c1 relative to c2.
To permit an explicit solution for the chosen value of s, I will
assume a logarithniic utility function: u(c1) =lnc1 and v(cp) =inc2.
Equation 2.1 then implies that the chosen value st* satisfies
(2.2) =A(1-4-p)
or
A * ______ cb
(2.3) = [(l_O)wti
—(i+X)1p)
Note that this is an extension of the usual result with a log—linear utility
function; with A =1and b =0,we get the familiar result that St* =0.5(1_0)vt
and therefore Cjt =0.5(1_0)wt.The rate of return matters only in converting
the future income (bt+i) to its present value. Low values of A and high values of
b both reduce saving while the underestimation of future social security bene-
fits (a low value of a) raises saving.—9--





Substituting 2.5 into 2.3 and noting that wt+l =(1+g)wand that (l+g)(l+n) =1+1
yields
* A O(1+y)wt (2.6) St= (l—O)w—______________
1 + A (l+A)(l+p)
Equation2.6 describes the saving behavior of all relevantgenerations
except the generation of retirees who receive unrequited benefits when the
social security programs began. Although thisgroup receives per capital bene-
fits of b0 =0w0(l+n),these were not anticipated at time t =—lwhen they made









Total utility at t =0is the sum of the utilities of the current
workers and the current retirees: w0 =(l+n)u(c10) +v(c2,0) or—10--
* w(1+p) (2.8) =(1+n)ln[(1—6)w0—s +in [ +
(1+A)(1-s-g)
where I have normalized bydividingall terms by the number of persons in the
first generation of retirees.1
For all subsequent years, (t >a),total utility takes the form:
(2.9) =(i+n)tlln[(1_6)wt —s1+(i+n)t +btl
=(1÷)t+1ln[l_6)wt- (l—6)w +a&(l+y)
Wt 1+A (1+A)(1+p)
t A(1+p)(1—6) ai—y) +(l+n) mE vt_i
—
(i+A)vt_i
This expression can be simplified by noting that W =W0(i+g)tand that
1 —x/(i+x)=
(2.10) =(l+r)t{ (i+n)ln[i_O+aO(i+y)(i+p)-]
+ in[ A(l+p)(1—6)+ O(i+y)(1÷X-)] }+
where C is a function of time that is independent of the policy parameter
It is clear from the form of 2.10 that the value of 6 that maximizes
for any t > 0 also maximizes Wt for all other values of t > 0. This value
of 0 does not correspond to the full social optimum since it ignores the
transfer of income from the first generaltion of workers (at t=a)to thecon-
currentgeneration of retirees. Nevertheless, unless future utility is
discounted at a very high rate, this initial period effect will be unimportant
relative to the effect in all future periods.
1This is of course the "true"utility. The paranieters A and c enter because
they influence individual 'behavior 'but not social evaluation.
2Ct(1+n)t+llnw0(l+g)t ——1-




where 11 is a pure time preference discount rate.1 4ore specifically,
(2.12)S =w0+f( 0, ,, , 1 + 0 )t+ C
t=1 l+n t=1
where the f function is specified in equation 2.10 and isindependent of time.
The second term converges to a finite value if and only ifri > n. This is also
a sufficient condition for the third term to converge.1 Since this term is
independent of 0, it can be ignored in the maximization.
Using equation 2.6 and 2.8 to write W0 explicitly and evaluating the
infinite sum in equation 2.12 implies that the optimal value 0* maximizes:2








Note that the first two terms correspond to the utility of workers andretirees
11t is clear from footnote2, page 10, that C increases as t(1+n)t and
therefore increases more slowly than (l+n)t for n >n as t tends to infinity.
evaluating W0 I have dropped the constant term (l+n)lnIw0/(1+X)}
+ln + ln(1+n).—12—
inthe first period (t =0)while the third and fourth terms correspond to the
utility of workers and retirees in all future years. As the utility discount
rate approaches the rate of population gro'.rth, the relative size of the terms
corresponding to the first period tends to zero.
I shall begin therefore by ignoring the first period effect and
finding the value of 0 that maximizes the steady—state level of utility. I
must emphasize that this is not equivalent to ignoring the obviously positive
transfer to the initial retirees but ignores the taxes paid by the initial
workers as well. After examining the steady—state solution, I shall return to
the more general problem and derive the optimal 0* corresponding to different
values of the utility discount rate.
The value of 0 that maximizes the steady—state level of utility is the
solution of the first—order condition1:
(2 l)
(l+n)Ia(l+y)(1+p)_1] + (l+a)(l+i)—X(1+p) = 0
1—aO(1+y)(1+p)1 X(l+ p)(l—e)÷(i+a)O(1+y)
Thespecialcase of a =0is interesting because it corresponds to the situation
in which individuals do not reduce their saving because of anticipated social
security benefits. Saving is affected only by the reduction in disposable
income caused by the tax at rate 0. With a =0,equation 2.l4 implies
(2 15) 0*= (l÷X)(1+y)—A(1-i-p)(2-i-n)
(l+A)(l+y)(2+n) —A(1+p)(2+n)
'This condition is equivalent to dwt/dO =0where W. is defined byequation
2.10 or equivalent dS'/dO=O with the first two terms of S' ignored. The second
order condition is easily checked and is always satisfied.—l-.--
Note first that with complete myopia ( A0) this reduces to O =(2+n),
the value derived in section 1 under the simpler specification of the complete
myopia problem. A reduction in myopia, i.e., an increase in A, necessarily
reduces 6*.It can be shown that
(2.16) dO* —(l+n)(l+i)(l+p)
dA (i+X)(1+y) —A(1+p)12(2+n)
This confirms that complete myopia sets the upper bound on the optimal tax and
benefit levels.
With anything less than complete myopia, individuals save and social
security distorts saving. The welfare loss of this distortion is an increasing
function of the marginal product of capital. vbre specifically, it is clear
that an increase in p reduces the numerator and denominator by an equal amount
I A(2+n) per unit of p] and therefore d6*/dp <0if A >0.
The extent of the welfare loss that is caused by reduced saving
depends on the implicit return that individuals receive from the unfunded social
security program. Since that rate of return is y, an increase in I reduces the
loss caused by decreased saving and therefore raises the optimal value of 6.
Differentiating with respect to I shows
(2.17) dO*= A(1+A)(l+p)(2+n)(1+n)
dl [l+y+A(y—p)](2+n)
which is clearly positive for A >0.
Equation 2.15showsthat there is a wide range of parameter values for
which it is optimal to have no social security program at all. More specifi-
cally, equation 2.15showsthat 0* =0when (l+A)(i-i-i) =A(1-s-p)(2+n),i.e., when
—1
A=(i+i)[(l+p)(2+n) —(i+y)1 .Since0* >0at A =0and equation 2.16 shows-1
that dO*/dA <0,0 <0for all values of A >(1+1)t(1+p)(2+n)—(l+y)].
If social security taxes and benefits are constrained to be non—negative, &0
for all A> (1—i) [(l+p)(2+n)—(l+y)].
To evaluate this critical threshold for A, it is importantto
interpretthe values of n, y and p as growth rates per period and not per year.
The model specifies that l+n is the ratio of the labor force in one generation
divided by the labor force in the previous generation. I shall again take a
generation to be 30 years. Since the U.S. labor force grew at an annual rate of
1.14 percent for the three decades beginning in 1950, l+n =(1.0114)
30
=2.97.
Finally, I will use the estimate that the average annual marginal product of
capital in U.S. nonfinancial corporationsduring these years 'was11.14 percent
(Feldstein,Poterba and Dicks—Mireaux,1981) and ite 1+p =(1.1114)
30
=25.5.
Substituting these values implies that the criticalvalue of A is 0.0149. A
positivesocial security program is justified under these conditions only if
individualsgive a weight of less than five percent to future utility.
Although these numbers are only illustrative, they do indicate that a
social security pension may 'be inappropriate even ifeconomicmyopia is univer-
salarid very substantial. This conclusion is not very sensitive to variations
inthe three parameters (p, y, and ri) that determine the critical value of A.
For example, reducing the annual marginal product ofcapitalfrom 11.14 percent
to8.0 percent or increasing the growth of income from 3.7percentto 7.0 per-
centstill implies that 0*0 for any A0.114.
In these calculations, I have assumed that cx 0,i.e., that indivi-
dualsignore future social security benefits when making their savings decision.
Social security therefore affected savings only by reducing the disposableincome of workers. When the analysis is extended to recognize that vorker
reducetheir saving in anticipation of future benefits, the optimal level of
social security benefits is even lower.
Consider, for example, an economy in which the annual marginal product
of capital is 8.0 percent, population grows at l.4 percent ayear, and real
income rises at 2.3 percent a year. If A =0.05and a =0,the optimal social
security tax rate is 0* =0.28.If individuals take 10 percent of their future
social security benefits into account (cx =0.10),the optimal tax rate falls
slightly to 0* =0.26.If individuals take half of their benefits into account
(cx=0.50),0*=0.20.Further increases in a cause 8* to decline rapidly. At
a =0.67,0*=0.
As I noted earlier, the value of O that maximizessteady state
welfare ignores the effect of taxing the first generation of workers and trans-
ferring these revenues to the first generation of beneficiaries. The importance
of this omission depends on the discount rate, Ti,usedto discount future utility.
We have implicitly been examining the limiting case of n n in which the
first period is irrelevant and the steady state welfare is the criterion. As
Tiincreases,more weight is given to the initial period relative to the steady
state. It is interesting therefore to consider the other extreme in which
n=andonly the initial period is important. With n = anda =0,the
first—order condition for a maximum of S' in equation 2.13 is
8' (l+n) + (1-i-A)(l+y) —0 2.1/ —
(i—o) A(l+p)+(1+A)(1+y) 8-
Usingthe values ofn,yandpthatcorrespond to the last three decades ofU.S.
experienceimplies that 0*0 if andonly ifA0.083. Thustaking the first—
yeareffects into account raises the critical value of A from 0.0149 to 0.083 but
leaves unchanged the conclusion that a positive social security program is
justified only if the universal nropia is extreme. For high 'but finite rates of
utility discount, the critical value of A lies between these extremes. For
example, an annual rate of utility discount of 5percentimplies that the criti—
cal value of A is o.o66 while a 10 percent discount rate makes the critical
value o.oi8.
Even when these high utility discount rates imply O >0,the optimal
value of remains low. For example, with an annual utility discount rate of
10 percent, the optimal value of 0 is only O.l4 implying an optimal benefit—wage
ratio of 0.21.
3.Optimal Benefits with a Heterogeneous Population
The conclusion of the previous section, that even with universal and
extreme rrropia it may be optimal to have no social security pension, rests on
the assumption that no one is completely rrropic.If some individuals are
completely nopic, some provision must be made to support them in their old age.
This might take the form of a means tested program or of private charity, as it
did before the introduction of the universal social security program. In this
section, however, I will assume that the only such support is the universal
social security program. I will divide the population into a group who are
completely myopic and a group who are not myopic at all and will examine how the
optimallevel of social security 'benefits varies with the fractions of the popu—
lation who are "myopes" and "life—cyclers".
As in the analysis of the previous section, the initial period differs
fromall subsequent periods 'because the initial retirees receive an unpredic—-17-
table windfall so that those who are not myopic have more private retirement
wealth than life—cyclers will in subsequent generations. All subsequent periods
are identical and the value of e that maximizes total utility in any one period
will maximize it in all periods. Lb simplify the analysis of this section, I
will focus on this steady state level of utility.
As in the previous section, workers earn wt and pay a social security
tax The myopes consume their entire disposable income, (1-e)w. The
life—cyclers set their saving optimally and therefore, using equation 2.3 with
== 1,5 =JI2[(l.0)wt
—bt+i/(1+p)1.Lifecyclers therefore consume
l[(l_O)wt + bt+i/(l+p)J during their working period. In retirement, the rrropes
consumption is equal to their social security benefits (bt+i) while the life—
cyclers consume st(l+P) + bt+i =l/2E(l_0)wt(1+P)+ bt+i].
The rate of growth of the labor force implies that there are always
1 + n workers for every retiree. I shall denote the fraction of myopesbyUand
normalize the social welfare equation by dividing all terms by the number of
retirees in that generation. For this model, total welfare in period t can
therefore be written:
(3.1) Wt =(l-+-n)pln[(l_O)w1 + (l+n)(l—U) in 0.5[(1_e)w +
+ ii in bt + (1—U) lnO.5[(l_8)wt (') + bt].
Since Vt(+g)V_1 and bt =(1÷n)t,equation 3.1 is equivalent to
(3.2) w =(1-4-n)Uin [1—Q)w] + (1+n)(l—U)irj 0.5 [(l—O)wt +
+ p in (i+n) Owt + (1—ii)ln 0.5 [(1_O)w (g)(1+p) + (1+n) t]
Since Vt is a factor of every term, it can be eliminated without altering the
valueof 0that maximizes Vt. Similarly the 0.5 factors can be eliminated and-1 -
thelast term can be rewritten (1—i)ln(1+n) +(1—p)ln[(i—e)(i+p)(i+y' +o].




Thefirst two terms correspond to the utility of the two groups of workers while
the second two terms correspond to the utility of the concurrent retirees. It
is clear from the third term (the utility of the myopic retirees) that 0 =0can
never be optimal.
Thefirst—ordercondition for a maximumofW' with respect to 0 is:
(1+n) (l+n) (i—a) [(i+y)(i+p) —i]
(3.14)0=— + +
1—0 1—0 +0(1+y)(i+p) 6
('—n)[l—(l+p)(l+y) I +
e + (l—6)(l+p)(i+y)
Notefirst that complete myopia for the entire population means U
and therefore implies




This is the same optimum condition derived for complete myopia in sections 1 and
2.It again represents the upper bound on the possible values of 0*. With the
1.14 percent annual population growth rate of the U.S. since 1950, this upper
bound is 0* =0.140.At the opposite extreme, if everyone is a lifecyler, ii= 0and condition 3.1k cannot be satisfied for any 0 '0;the optimum O is negative
and the feasible optimum is to have no social security program.
Some tedious but straightforward manipulation permits equation 3.14 to
berewritten as:
(3.) e2 (2+n)(l—x)-0f(2+n)(l—x)(l—p) +p(3+n—x)]+p=
wherex =(l+y)(1+p).This quadraticequation shows that that optimal social
security tax rate varies from 0 =0to 0* =(2+nYas the frequency of myopia
variesfrom ii= 0to p =1.For the values of a, y and p corresponding to the
U.S. experience of the past three decades, the optimal value of 0 varies almost
linearly with p with 0* =0.11at p =0.25,0* =0.21at p =0.50and 0* =0.31
at p =0.75.The corresponding optimal benefit—wage ratiOs are =0.17at
p =0.25,t3 =0.32at p =0.50and =0.147at p =0.75.Thus more than half
of the population must be completely myopic for the optimal benefit—wage ratio
to be as high as one—third and more than three—fourths must be completely myopic
for the optimal benefit—wage ratio to be as high as one—half.
A realistic description of the population presumably involves a
distribution of degrees of myopia. The analysis of this section and of the pre-
vious one suggests that even if (say) one—fourth of the population were completely
myopic while three—fourths were so myopic that they gave future utility
only one—fourth the weight of the current utility, the optimal ratio of social
security benefits to wages would be very low, probably less than 0.20.
14.Conclusion
Although the specific numerical results reflect the simplified model
and the logarithmic utility structure, the broad qualitative results are likely—20—
to be valid more generally. The analysis has shown that even if every indivi-
dual is substantially myopic (and would therefore save less for his retirement
than perfect foresight utility maximization would imply) ,itmay be optimal to
have either no social security retirement program or a very low ratio of
benefits to earnings. If some fraction of the population is completely myopic
and would in the absence of a social security pension do no retirement saving,
it cannot be optimal to have no social security program (unless some other
retirement income is provided for nonsavers.) Nevertheless, the optimal level
ofbenefits naybe quite low unless a large fraction of the population is
completelymyopic.
Itwould, of course, be desirable to examine the sensitivity of these
results to a richer class of models. Such extensions might includea tax on
capital income (implying a gap between the marginal product of capital and the
rate of return that influences individual savings decisions)1 and a wider class
ofindividual utility functions. The "mixed case" of a fraction of the popula—
tion that is completely nryopic while the rest are partly nryopic might also be
usefully analyzed. The assumption of predetermined retirement behavior should
be modified to recognize that social security benefits influence retirement
behavior and that planned retirement alters the individual's rate of saving.
The analyses of both models show how the optimal size of the social
security program is related to the steady—state rates of growth of population
and productivity and to the marginal product of capital. Current policy
discussions about the adjustment of social security to the productivity slowdown
andthe changing demographic structure ofthe population suggest that these
'Feldstein(1982b) shows the importance of a capital income tax in
evaluating the welfare cost of the saving distortion induced by social security.—21—
models might provide a useful framework for studying how the level of social
security benefits should be changed in response to tenrporary changes in the
rates of growth of population and productivity.
Finally, it would be good to relax the assumption that benefits are to
be provided uniformly and without reference to accumulated assets. The
appropriate role for means—tested benefits for retirees could be derived by
including such transfers as an additional parametric option in an extended ver-
sion of the present models.
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